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Abstract – The aim of this study was to evaluate a range of statistical and geostatistical methods for
their usefulness in providing insights into how highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) subtype H5N1
might spread through a national population of village poultry. The insights gained allow the generation of
disease dispersion hypotheses. The case study data set consisted of 161 outbreaks of HPAI subtype H5N1 in
village poultry reported in Romania between October 2005 and June 2006. Reports of village outbreaks (%)
occurred in three waves: October–December (14%), February–March (16%), and May–June (68%). Risk
mapping – based on variography and kriging – was used to visualize the evolution of the epidemic.
Outbreaks first appeared in eastern and southern Romania, particularly within an area that forms part of
the Danube River Delta. The largest phase of the epidemic affected villages in all parts of central, southern,
and eastern Romania, but outbreaks were clustered in central Romania. Outbreaks spread in an east to west
direction. By using geostatistical visualisation and spatial statistics, the evolution of the epidemic could be
characterised into two parts: disease introduction, local spread, and sporadic outbreaks, and long-distance
disease spread with rapid epidemic propagation. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the environment
and landscape (specifically the Danube River Delta) played a critical role in the introduction and initial
spread of HPAI subtype H5N1 during the autumn and winter of 2005, and that the movement of poultry
might have introduced the infection into central Romania during the spring and summer of 2006. Further
research focusing on the spatio-temporal interface between the two parts of the epidemic might reveal how
and why it progressed from a confined, local epidemic to a large, national epidemic. Such information would
assist efforts to limit the global spread of HPAI subtype H5N1.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)
virus subtype H5N1 is an emerging issue
for world health: it has caused numerous
disease outbreaks in domestic poultry and
wild bird populations, and threatens human
health. Between 1997 and 2007, a total of 312
cases of human infection has been reported
to the World Health Organization, resulting in
* Corresponding author: mward@cvm.tamu.edu
190 (61%) deaths in 12 countries in South-
East Asia, China, central Asia, the Middle
East, and Africa1. There is a fear that H5N1
could become the next pandemic influenza
strain [1]. Because exposure to sick or dead
1 World Health Organization, Cumulative number
of confirmed human cases of avian influenza
A/(H5N1), reported to WHO, 12 June 2007, http://
www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/
cases_table_2007_06_12/en [consulted 16 June
2007].
Article available at http://www.vetres.org or http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/vetres:2007063
Vet. Res. (2008) 39:22 M.P. Ward et al.
poultry is a strong risk factor for human
disease caused by HPAI subtype H5N1 [9],
the threat of pandemic flu can be reduced
by more effectively controlling the spread of
HPAI through national poultry flocks. The first
step in controlling the spread of HPAI subtype
H5N1 is to understand how it spreads once
introduced to a country. Epidemic data provide
a valuable insight into such disease spread
patterns.
Avian influenza virus infection is endemic
in a range of free-living bird species world-
wide [1], particularly species associated
with water – Anseriformes (ducks, geese,
swans) and Charadriiformes (gulls, terns,
shorebirds) [25]. Waterfowl can be infected by
all subtypes of type A influenza viruses, with
few or no clinical signs [33]. These species
are capable of spreading influenza viruses
between regions [13].
Research suggests that waterfowl and
shorebirds maintain a separate reservoir of
viral gene pools from which new virus
subtypes emerge [32]. In the recent outbreaks
of HPAI subtype H5N1 in waterfowl, the virus
has been more prevalent in respiratory tissue
than intestinal tissue [26]. Persistence of this
strain in migratory waterfowl (or even the
environment) could be due to the prolonged
shedding of virus in ducks, as well as changes
in the virus that allows transmission via
respiratory routes [26]. Prior to the recent
HPAI subtype H5N1 outbreaks in ducks, host
adaptation and lack of virulence in aquatic
birds was cited as the reason for persistence
in these species [32]. Recent studies in China
have shown that viral lineages, established in
poultry, have infected ducks [15, 26].
In the northern hemisphere, avian influenza
virus infection rates are highest during spring
migration for gulls and shorebirds, whereas
waterfowl infections peak in late summer
and early fall [13]. Juvenile waterfowl are
more susceptible to infection; when the birds
are migrating south, a higher prevalence is
observed than in the spring, when the juveniles
have matured [8].
HPAI outbreaks in poultry are sometimes
assumed to occur from contact with wild avian
species [12, 17, 27]. The HPAI subtype H5N1
currently circulating in Asia may have arisen
from a goose virus in Guangdong, which then
infected poultry and reassorted with a H9N2
and/or a H6N1 subtype virus. When the HPAI
virus subtype H5N1 infected humans in Hong
Kong in 1997, several deaths were reported.
The strain was eradicated from poultry, but it
continued to circulate in geese. In 2002, the
haemagglutinin (HA) gene showed antigenic
drift – especially in the Z genotypes, found
in chickens, humans, and aquatic poultry [31].
This genotype is pathogenic in ducks, causing
neurological disease and death; in other cases,
no clinical disease was observed. Traditional
husbandry practices in China and Southeast
Asia, which favour commingling of multiple
avian and mammalian species – as well as the
popularity of live bird markets – may have
contributed to the maintenance of the H5N1
virus strain [24]. In other regions of the world,
HPAI outbreaks in commercial poultry have
been traced to live bird markets [6, 10, 16].
Outbreaks of transboundary diseases, such
as HPAI, provide a unique insight into
how animal diseases spread through space
and time. Through the information gener-
ated, a better understanding of the under-
lying causes of the disease process can
be gained, facilitating the design of dis-
ease prevention programs and surveillance
systems.
The aim of this study was to evaluate a
range of spatial statistical and geostatistical
methods for their usefulness in providing
insights and generating hypotheses regarding
how HPAI subtype H5N1 might spread
through a national population of village
poultry. To achieve this aim, an epidemic
disease data set describing 161 village poultry
outbreaks of HPAI subtype H5N1 in Romania
between 2005 and 2006 was used. Several
techniques that have not widely been applied
to analyse such data, including directional
tests, local cluster tests, and kriging, were
evaluated. The primary null hypothesis tested
was that outbreaks of HPAI subtype H5N1
in Romania between 2005 and 2006 were
randomly distributed in time and space. The
secondary null hypothesis tested was that
the spatial distribution of outbreaks during
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temporal phases of the epidemic were the
same.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
The first outbreak of HPAI subtype H5N1 was
detected in Romania in early October 2005. The
last outbreak was reported in early June 2006.
Data available for confirmed outbreaks included
the outbreak location (x, y coordinates), county
and date of occurrence. An epidemic curve was
constructed by counting the number of outbreaks
reported per week between October 2005 and June
2006. The median epidemic date and epidemic
interquartile range (dates between which 50% of
outbreaks were reported) were calculated (Statistix
8.0, Analytical Software, Tallahassee, FL, USA).
Reported outbreaks were mapped using Dealul
Piscului 1970 datum and a Stereographic 70
projection system (ArcGIS™ 9.0, ESRI Inc.,
Redland, CA, USA). The mean center and
deviational ellipse of these outbreaks was calculated
(ArcGIS™ 9.0 Spatial Statistics, ESRI Inc.); these
descriptive statistics were also estimated, weighted
by the number of days since the first outbreak was
reported (7 October 2005). In addition, descriptive
statistics were also estimated for each of the
epidemic phases identified.
A directional statistic [11] was used to determine
if there was a systematic, directional spread of
outbreaks through Romania during the epidemic
period. A chain of infection was constructed by
first sequencing the outbreaks by date of occurrence
(the primary outbreak first, followed by the second
outbreak, and so on). A line was then drawn to
connect the location of the first outbreak to the
location of the second outbreak, repeating this
until all outbreaks were connected. This chain of
infection had two ends (the first and last outbreaks)
and branches when outbreaks occurred on the
same date. Various possible “chains of infection”
were investigated by specifying the time connection
matrix as relative (each outbreak connected to
all of the outbreaks that followed it), adjacent
(each outbreak connected only to its temporal
nearest neighbouring outbreak) and following (each
outbreak connected only to the outbreaks that
immediately followed it). The test statistic is a
vector whose direction is the average direction
of the links making up the chain of infection,
and whose magnitude is the angular variance of
these links. When these links all point in the
same direction, the angular variance is small; when
they point in many directions the angular variance
is large. The significance of the test statistic
was estimated by Monte Carlo simulation, using
ClusterSeer version 2.0 (TerraSeer Inc. 2002, Ann
Arbor, MI, USA).
The spatio-temporal distribution of outbreaks
was described by Moran’s autocorrelation statistic
(ArcGIS™ 9.0 Spatial Statistics), in which the
outcome of interest was outbreak day. Variography
(Variowin 2.0. University of Lausanne, Switzer-
land) and kriging (ArcGIS™ 9.0 Spatial Analyst)
was also used to visualize the spatio-temporal
distribution of the epidemic. Outbreaks reoccurred
at four locations. All possible unique pairs of
outbreak locations (n = 12 880) were formed using
all unique outbreak locations (n = 161). A matrix
of Euclidean distances and date (day) of outbreak
was calculated and a semivariogram was formed.
A semivariogram is a plot of the semivariance of
all pairs of locations at a series of defined distances
(lags) [28]. For locations close to each other, values
(for example, the epidemic day of reporting in this
study) are expected to be similar and the semivari-
ance will be low. For example, within a local neigh-
borhood, if a disease is contagious outbreaks are
expected to be reported from these locations within
a relatively narrow window of time. Thus, epidemic
day values will be highly correlated. As locations
get farther apart, values are expected to become
more dissimilar (for example, reported outbreak
day will vary greatly) and thus the semivariance
increases. The rate of increase in semivariance as
distance increases (nugget and sill), and the distance
at which locations can essentially be considered
independent (range), characterizes the spatial
pattern of the event-of-interest. A range of lag
numbers and lag spacings were chosen to produce
a semivariogram which could be described by one
of a number of a priori models. Several statistical
models (exponential, Gaussian, spherical, power)
were investigated to identify a line of best fit. Using
the line-of-best-fit approach, the parameters of the
selected model (nugget, range, sill) were estimated.
Estimating the parameters of the line of best fit of
an empirical semivariogram allows the distribution
to be modeled and interpolated with techniques
such as kriging. The estimated parameters were
used to produce an interpolated map of outbreak
day. These maps were overlaid on the location of
outbreaks to identify localities (rather than individ-
ual villages) where outbreaks were reported early
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during the epidemic. Identification of areas where
epidemic disease first occurs can provide clues to
the mechanisms of disease introduction and subse-
quent spread. Such information can be applied to
the design of disease prevention programs, disease
surveillance and risk assessments.
Local clusters of outbreaks were investigated by
estimating Anselin’s local indicator of spatial auto-
correlation statistic (ArcGIS™ 9.0 Spatial Statis-
tics). Spatial weights were defined by the inverse
of Euclidean distance squared, and were globally
standardized. Reported outbreaks were also exam-
ined (SaTScan version 6.1.2, www.satscan.org) for
clusters in time and space using the scan statistic
space-time permutation model [14]. Outbreak data
– location [x, y] and reported date of outbreaks
[z] – were analysed. In the space-time permu-
tation model, the number of observed cases in
a cluster is compared to what would have been
expected if the spatial and temporal locations of
all cases were independent of each other, that is,
no space-time interaction [14]. The data were only
scanned for clusters with excess number of out-
breaks: areas in Romania that, during a specified
time period, had a high proportion of village out-
breaks compared to surrounding areas. We assumed
that the number of villages in Romania (the popula-
tion at-risk) remained stable during the nine-month
study period. A scanning window of 14 days and
10 km radius was used to reflect potential disease
spread. Monte Carlo replications were used to esti-
mate the statistical significance of the likelihood
ratio statistics of the clusters identified (SaTScan
version 6.1.2).
3. RESULTS
During the epidemic period (243 days), a
total of 165 outbreaks were detected in 25
of the 41 counties (judete) of Romania. The
mean number of outbreaks per county was
four. The largest number of outbreaks were
reported from Brasov (29) and Prahova (28)
in central Romania, Bacau (14) in northeast
Romania, and Constanta (14) and Tulcea (11)
in eastern Romania. The median epidemic date
was 18 May (day 224 of the epidemic). Half
of all outbreaks were reported during an 85-
day period, between 27 February and 23 May
(epidemic days 144–229). Visual inspection
of the epidemic curve (Fig. 1) revealed three
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Figure 1. Epidemic curve of highly-pathogenic
avian influenza subtype H5N1 outbreaks in Roma-
nia, October 2005 – June 2006. The three phases of
the epidemic are indicated by dashed lines.
epidemic phases: 7 October–29 December
2005 (days 1–84), 30 December 2005–
16 April 2006 (days 85–192), and 17 April–
6 June 2006 (days 193–243).
Since outbreaks reoccurred at four loca-
tions, spatial analysis was restricted to a total
number of 161 unique outbreak locations. The
mean distance between outbreak locations was
9.5 km. The mean center (x = 603 446, y =
416 655) of reported outbreaks in Romania
was 29 km north-east of the mean center
(x = 577 067, y = 428 360) of outbreaks
weighted by outbreak day. The mean centers
of outbreaks reported in the first and second
epidemic phases (x = 721 033, y = 376 624
and x = 715 981, y = 333 656, respectively)
were located 43 km apart in eastern Romania.
The mean center of outbreaks reported in
the third epidemic phase (x = 551 993, y =
444 363) was located in central Romania,
58 km north-west of the mean center of all
reported outbreaks. Standard deviational
ellipses calculated for these three epidemic
phases increased in temporal sequence (7 713,
10 370, and 13 810 km2, respectively), but
their shape (latitude:longitude standard
deviation ratio 2.12, 2.80, and 1.24, respec-
tively) and angle (283, 275, and 319◦) varied
(Fig. 2): the first two epidemic phases were
spatially-distributed east-west, whereas the
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Figure 2. Distribution of highly-pathogenic avian influenza subtype H5N1 outbreaks (•) in Romania,
October 2005–June 2006. The mean centers () and standard deviational ellipses of the three epidemic
phases (1: 7 October–29 December 2005; 2: 30 December 2005–16 April 2006; 3: 17 April–6 June 2006)
are shown.
third phase displayed a more regular circular
distribution.
A significant (P < 0.001) epidemic direc-
tion was detected only when the outbreak time
connection matrix was assumed to be rela-
tive (each outbreak connected to all of the
outbreaks that followed it). For all outbreaks,
the average angle of spread was 282◦ (east
to west), although the angular concentration
(0.314) indicated moderate variation in the
direction of spread. Outbreaks reported during
phases 1 and 2 of the epidemic and phase 3
showed very similar (0.239 and 0.237, respec-
tively), significant (P < 0.001) angular con-
centrations, and the angular direction of each
of these sub-epidemics was southerly (167–
177◦), in contrast to the westerly (282◦) angu-
lar direction of the overall epidemic.
The semivariogram of outbreak day, using
15 lags and a lag size of 25 km (Fig. 3) was
best fit by a spherical model, with an estimated
nugget, range, and partial sill of 3.6, 190 km
and 4.32, respectively. This model implies that
the reported epidemic day of outbreaks located
within a distance of approximately 190 km are
correlated, and that approximately 55% of the
variance in reported epidemic day might be
explained by the location of outbreak. The
resulting map of interpolated outbreak day
(Fig. 4) clearly shows the occurrence of H5N1
outbreaks in eastern Romania during the first
120 days of the epidemic.
The distribution of outbreaks was strongly
clustered (I = 0.74, P < 0.001) by outbreak
day. A significant cluster of outbreaks in
southeastern Romania was identified by the
local indicator of spatial autocorrelation
(LISA) statistic (Fig. 5). In this area, outbreaks
occurred in 11 villages within a distance of
approximately 65 km between 20 November
(page number not for citation purpose) Page 5 of 12
Vet. Res. (2008) 39:22 M.P. Ward et al.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 325 350 375
distance, km
Y|h
|
Figure 3. Semivariogram of the day of highly-pathogenic avian influenza subtype H5N1 village outbreak in
Romania, October 2005–June 2006.
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Figure 4. Interpolated day of highly-pathogenic avian influenza subtype H5N1 village outbreak in Romania,
October 2005–June 2006. The Danube River is shown.
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Figure 5. A cluster ( ) of highly-pathogenic avian influenza subtype H5N1 village outbreaks (•) in
Romania, October 2005–June 2006, identified by the local indicator of spatial autocorrelation statistic.
and 15 December 2006 (epidemic days 45
and 70).
Three significant (P < 0.05) space-
time clusters of outbreaks were identified
(Fig. 6). The most likely cluster (P = 0.029)
included ten villages located in Constanta
county, south-east Romania (x = 751 967,
y = 319 610; radius 8 733 m). Within this
cluster, three outbreaks were reported between
27 February and 2 March 2006. Based on
the area of the cluster and the time period,
only 0.07 outbreaks would be expected to be
reported. Other, significant (P = 0.03) clus-
ters identified were located in Brasov county,
central Romania (11 villages: x = 492 542,
y = 485 538, radius 8,597 m; four outbreaks
reported between 2 and 15 May 2006, 0.22
outbreaks expected) and Braila county, south-
east Romania (six villages: x = 695 960,
y = 387 007, radius 7 263 m; four out-
breaks reported between 18 November and
1 December 2005, 0.22 outbreaks expected).
4. DISCUSSION
Outbreaks of HPAI subtype H5N1 in
Romania between 2005 and 2006 were not
randomly distributed in time and space. Fur-
thermore, differences in the spatial distribu-
tion of outbreaks during temporal phases of
the epidemic were identified, which might sug-
gest differences in the mechanism of disease
spread.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
can be introduced into populations of domes-
tic poultry from wild waterfowl. Spread of
virus within populations of domestic poul-
try is likely to be via the movement of live
birds or fomites. The application of a range
of spatial statistical and geostatistical meth-
ods to analyse data from large HPAI outbreaks
can provide insights into the contribution of
these various introduction and spread path-
ways. As an example, results of analysis in
the present study suggest that HPAI subtype
(page number not for citation purpose) Page 7 of 12
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Figure 6. Clusters ( ) of highly-pathogenic avian influenza subtype H5N1 village outbreaks (•) in Romania,
October 2005–June 2006, identified by the space-time permutation scan statistic.
H5N1 might have been introduced to eastern
and southern Romania via migratory water-
fowl during the autumn and winter of 2005,
but that spread to central Romania in the spring
and summer of 2006 might have occurred via
the transportation of domestic poultry species.
Although information on transmission route
was not available in this study, a comparison
of disease spread based on Euclidean distance
versus the road network could be informative.
We believe that all outbreaks of HPAI sub-
type H5N1 that occurred in Romania during
the study period were reported. This conclu-
sion is based on the dramatic clinical appear-
ance of the disease in naive populations. The
primary intervention methods deployed dur-
ing this epidemic, following detection of each
outbreak, were quarantine, depopulation, dis-
infection, and serological surveillance of sen-
tinel chicken flocks. It is impossible to gauge
the effectiveness of these interventions, since
the outcome in the absence of such interven-
tion is unknown. We focused on the day of
first reporting of each outbreak, rather than for
example the length of each outbreak. Study
results have relevance to the design of pre-
ventive and surveillance programs for HPAI
subtype H5N1, rather than specifically how
such an epidemic might be most effectively
controlled.
The role that wild, migratory birds played
in the spread of HPAI subtype H5N1 from
east Asia to central Asia, the Middle East,
Europe, and Africa during 2005 to 2006 is
still debated. Circumstantial evidence has
implicated migratory birds, in some cases,
as the mechanism of spread. For example,
subtype H5N1 virus was detected at Erkhel
Lake in Mongolia during the summer of 2005;
because of the remoteness of this location
and absence of domestic poultry in the area,
introduction of this subtype via human activ-
ities was ruled-out. The best explanation was
introduction via migratory wild birds [20].
In the northern hemisphere, influenza virus
infection rates are highest in waterfowl in
late summer and autumn, during southern
migrations from breeding areas [13]. The
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first Romanian outbreaks of HPAI subtype
H5N1 were reported on 7 October 2005 from
two villages (60 km apart) located within
the Danube River Delta region of southeast
Romania. Coincidently, the first outbreak of
subtype H5N1 in nearby Turkey was reported
on 5 October, from the north-west region of
the country [5]. Based on genetic analysis
of the neuramidase (NA) gene of isolates
from this first Turkish outbreak, the virus
responsible was very similar to the A7 Great
Black Headed Gull/Qinghai/1/05 lineage,
and thus a link with central Asian outbreaks
during 2005 was established. Considering the
autumn migratory flyways of some Anatidae
(ducks, swans and geese) from the West
Siberian Lowlands and results of the analysis
of outbreak data, it is likely that wild birds
played a role in the introduction of subtype
H5N1 to Romania during October–December
20052.
Southeastern Romania is unique: it is
bordered to the east by the Black Sea
and is characterized by the Danube River
Delta. There is an extensive wetland system,
forming a major breeding area and point of
congregation for migratory birds on the Black
Sea–Mediterranean flyway (which extends
from west Africa to central Asia). In this
region, poultry production is almost entirely
based at the village level. It is common for
birds to have free range during the daylight
hours, and contact with wild birds is likely at
sites such as ponds and lakes. The movement
of live poultry between villages is uncommon,
and live bird markets do not exist.
At least 23 species of Anatidae overwinter
in the Black Sea region3. Romania lies
entirely within the European Siberia/Black
2 Food and Agriculture Organisation, EMPRES
Watch: Evolution of highly pathogenic avian
influenza type H5N1 in Europe: review of disease
ecology, trends and prospects of spread in autumn-
winter 2006, http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/
214878/W_europe_oct06_hpai.pdf [consulted 25
June 2007].
3 Waterbird Population Estimates, 2006,
www.wetlands.org [consulted 16 June 2007].
Sea-Mediterranean flyway4, but the main
routes of wild bird migration in Romania are
not precisely known. More importantly, the
migratory routes of wild birds vary by species.
HPAI subtype H5N1 virus was reportedly
isolated in Romania during 2005–20065
from four Anatidae species with a breeding
range that extends to West Siberia: Cygnus
cygnus (Whooper Swan), Anas penelope
(Eurasian Wigeon), Anas crecca (Common
Teal), and Anas acuta (Northern Pintail). A
high mortality rate was observed in swans in
the Danube River Delta during the epidemic.
C. cygnus is a Palearctic species that is almost
entirely migratory. It consists of probably
four subpopulations, one of which breeds in
western Siberia and winters in the Black Sea
and east Mediterranean. The Danube River
Delta is an important wintering site: 20–
30% of the population can be found here
during winter [23]. C. cygnus depart from their
breeding grounds in mid- to late-September.
Of interest to note is that the first detection
of HPAI subtype H5N1 in the British Isles
was isolation from a dead Whooper Swan
sampled in March 2006, in Fife, Scotland
[2]. Another species of interest with respect
to HPAI subtype H5N1 virus spread is the
Mute Swan (Cygnus olor). The first incursion
of HPAI subtype H5N1 virus in the Czech
Republic was detected in this species [19].
Although the distribution of C. olor includes
Romania, most of this species breeding in
the Black Sea region undertake only limited
migratory movements, leaving inland breeding
4 Isakov Y.A., MAR project and conservation of
waterfowl breeding in the USSR, in: Salverda Z.
(Ed.), Proc. Second European meeting on wildfowl
conservation, Noordwijk aan Zee, The Netherlands,
9–14 May 1966, pp. 125–138. Ministry of Cultural
Affairs, Recreation and Social Welfare, The
Netherlands, 1967.
5 Ontanu G., Nicolae S., Savuta G., Stochici
A., Hulea M., Matei F.G., Risk analysis for
avian influenza – risk identification and emission
assessment, in: Proceedings of the 11th Sym-
posium of the ISVEE, Cairns, Australia, 2006,
http://www.sciquest.org.nz/crusher_download.asp?
article=10002812 [consulted 16 June 2007].
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areas to winter on the coasts of the Black
Sea [23].
If the H5N1 subtype was introduced to
Romania via migratory waterfowl, winter
conditions might have initially limited its
spread to southeastern Romania. Thus, only
localized outbreaks occurred as the result
of contact between wild birds and domestic
village poultry at common feeding sites, such
as ponds and lakes. In this study, interpolation
facilitated identification of the central role of
the environment and landscape (specifically
the Danube River Delta) in the introduction
and initial spread of HPAI subtype H5N1 in
Romania during the 2005–2006 epidemic.
The overall direction of spread of HPAI
subtype H5N1 outbreaks was westerly, but the
direction of spread within both the early and
later phases of the epidemic was southerly.
Within Romania, wild bird migration in
general follows the Danube River (Fig. 4),
which would explain the southerly direction
of spread in the first two phases of the
epidemic. The spatio-temporal distributions of
reported cases of the avian influenza H5N1
in southern China during a six-week period
(19 January through 9 March 2004) has
been investigated [21]. A major northeast-
southwest distribution of the avian influenza
H5N1 cases was observed. This directional
finding is consistent with the major migratory
bird routes in east Asia. The reason for the
southerly direction of spread in the last phase
of the epidemic in Romania is unknown. The
movement of domestic poultry within central
Romania could be an explanation.
Although migrating birds are a logical
link between seemingly isolated outbreaks
of HPAI subtype H5N1 in domestic poultry
populations, isolation of the H5N1 subtype
from healthy wild birds is rare; and this
observation seemingly argues against wild
migratory birds playing a major role in the
spread of the infection (aptly summarized
in the refrain, “Dead ducks don’t fly”). In
addition, the H5N1 subtype has not spread
via known migratory flyways, as expected, to
locations such as the Philippines and Taiwan,
and Alaska. Whilst outbreaks of influenza in
domestic poultry continue to be blamed on
contact with free-range and wild birds, based
on the circumstantial evidence of co-location
of wild birds and domestic poultry in time
and space [7], illegal movements of poultry
and other avian species have been documented
as contributing to H5N1 spread in several
instances [20, 24]. Live bird markets have also
been the presumed source of avian influenza
outbreaks in domestic poultry, notably in
the United States [6, 10, 16, 18, 22] and in
Asia [24].
The route of wild bird migration within
Romania (following in general the Danube
River; Fig. 4) is not consistent with the spread
of HPAI subtype H5N1 from southeastern
to central Romania. An explanation might
be the movement of domestic poultry (for
sale or consumption) between the regions.
The use of spatial statistical and geostatistical
methods in this study highlights a potentially
important transition zone in eastern Romania,
where a critical mass of infected poultry
might have developed and promoted the large
number of outbreaks reported during the
spring and summer of 2006 from central
Romania. Using only mean center and
directional deviational ellipse statistics, the
distributions of phases 1 and 2 were clearly
differentiated from phase 3. Interpolation
of outbreak day using kriging produced an
isopleth map that is also consistent with a
phased epidemic. Kriging is a visualisation
technique that can assist in the identification
of disease spread patterns. Although it is
a data-driven technique, the lag size and
number of lags must be selected somewhat
subjectively to produce a semivariogram that
can be parametrically modeled. In this study
a lag of 25 km was selected as the distance
which, in combination with a lag number
of 15, produced a semivariogram that could
successfully be modelled. A range of lag
sizes were considered, but the resulting
semivariograms were not as amenable to
modelling as the semivariogram produced
using a lag size of 25 km. The mean distance
between outbreak locations in this study was
9.5 km, so the choice of a lag distance less than
approximately 10–15 km would have provided
less information for semivariogram modelling.
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A rule-of-thumb for determining the lag size is
that the product of lag size and number of lags
should be approximately half the maximum
distance of all possible pairs of locations [3,4].
In this study, the maximum distance between
pairs of outbreak locations was 534 km. Using
the rule-of-thumb and a fixed number of
15 lags, an appropriate lag size might be
approximately 18 km. Modelling of the semi-
variogram allows a better understanding of the
spatial nature of data, and allows interpolation
to be performed. The reason for using an
interpolation technique, such as kriging, is to
reveal disease occurrence patterns that might
not be visualized by simply dot or choropleth
maps. This process assists in generating
hypotheses regarding disease spread (for
example, wild migratory birds versus transport
of infected poultry). However, the resulting
isopleth maps should not be interpreted as a
prediction of disease outbreak occurrence at a
given location, or as a quantitative estimation
of outbreak day.
A notable cluster of four village outbreaks
in southeast Romania, 18 November and 1
December 2005, was detected using the spatial
scan statistic. A cluster of nine outbreaks, also
in southeast Romania, between 20 Novem-
ber 2005 and 7 January 2006 was detected
using the local indicator of spatial autocor-
relation. Cluster detection statistics are not
powerful, and it has been recommended that
more than one technique be used to analyse
the distribution of disease events [29, 30]. The
results of the analytical approaches used in
this study were, in general, consistent and
complementary. Considering the location and
timing of these clusters (Figs. 5 and 6),
descriptive spatial statistics (Fig. 2), and visu-
alization of the epidemic evolution (Fig. 4),
one of more of these outbreaks might have
been the origin for the outbreaks that occurred
in central Romania during 2006, a period
during which the HPAI subtype H5N1
epidemic apparently changed from predomi-
nantly being associated with migratory water-
fowl to a more complex epidemic in which
the movement of poultry and poultry products
might have been a factor. The study of land-
scape, animal production, and human factors
in such epidemic transition zones can help us
to understand why large outbreaks of HPAI
subtype H5N1 occur in countries previously
free of infection. Spatial statistics and geosta-
tistical methods have a role to play in helping
us resolve the debate over the role of migratory
wild birds versus the movement of poultry and
poultry products in the global spread of HPAI
subtype H5N1.
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